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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
    
 
Nos. 12-1446 and 12-1903 
    
 
KAREN CAMESI; ERIN O'CONNELL;  
LORI SHAFFER; DINAH BAKER, 
on behalf of themselves and all other employees 
similarly situated, 
 
    Appellants in Case No. 12-1446 
 
v. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER; 
UPMC; UPMC HEALTH SYSTEM; UPMC BEDFORD 
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; UPMC BRADDOCK; UPMC 
MCKEESPORT; UPMC NORTHWEST; UPMC 
PASSAVANT; UPMC PRESBYTERIAN; UPMC 
PRESBYTERIAN SHADYSIDE; UPMC SHADYSIDE; 
UPMC SOUTHSIDE; UPMC ST. MARGARET;  
MAGEE WOMEN’S HOSPITAL OF UPMC; MERCY 
HOSPITAL OF PITTSBURGH; MONTEFIORE 
HOSPITAL; MONTEFIORE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL; 
WESTERN PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE AND CLINIC; 
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF PITTSBURGH OF THE 
UPMC HEALTH SYSTEM; UPMC LEE; UPMC 
HORIZON; UPMC HOLDING COMPANY, INC.;  
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UPMC HEALTH NETWORK, INC.; JEFFREY A. 
RAMOFF; GREGORY PEASLEE; UPMC 401A 
RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN; UPMC 403B 
RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN; UPMC BASIC 
RETIREMENT PLAN 
 
 
 
ANDREW KUZNYETSOV; CHARLES BOAL; 
MARTHANN HEILMAN, 
 
                                                Appellants in Case No. 12-1903 
 
v. 
 
WEST PENN ALLEGHENY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC; 
THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HEALTHCARE 
SYSTEM, INC.; ALLE-KISKI MEDICAL CENTER; 
ALLEGHENY GENERAL HOSPITAL;  
ALLEGHENY GENERAL HOSPITAL-SUBURBAN 
CAMPUS; CANONSBURG GENERAL HOSPITAL; THE 
WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL; 
CHRISTOPHER T. OLIVIA; JOHN LASKY; 
RETIREMENT PLAN FOR EMPLOYEES OF WEST PENN 
ALLEGHENY HEALTH SYSTEM; ALLE-KISKI 
MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; ALLE-KISKI WOMEN'S 
HEALTH; ALLEGHENY MEDICAL PRACTICE 
NETWORK; ALLEGHENY SINGER RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE; ALLEGHENY SPECIALTY PRACTICE 
NETWORK; ALLEGHENY VALLEY INTERNAL 
MEDICINE; ASSOCIATED SURGEONS OF WESTERN 
PENNSYLVANIA; ASSOCIATED SURGEONS OF 
WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA P.C.; BARRY SEGAL, MD; 
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BELLEVUE MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; BELLEVUE 
PEDIATRIC ASSOCIATES; BURN CARE ASSOCIATES, 
LTD.; BURRELL INTERNAL MEDICINE; CABOT 
MEDICAL CENTER; CANONSBURG COMMUNITY 
HEALTHCARE CENTER; CENTER FOR FAMILY 
HEALTH CARE; CENTURY MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; 
CENTURY III MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; CITIZENS 
SCHOOL OF NURSING; CORKERY, HEISE, DAINESI & 
TRAPANOTTO; CRAFTON MEDICAL CENTER; 
CREIGHTON MEDICAL CENTER; DR. FRANCIS J. 
CAVANAUGH, MD; DR. MEHERNOSH KHAN; EAST 
END MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; EAST SUBURBAN 
FAMILY PRACTICE; EAST SUBURBAN OB/GYN; 
FAMILY NURSE MIDWIVES; FERLAN GROUP; 
FRIENDSHIP MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; FORBES 
HOSPICE; FUGE FAMILY PRACTICE; GREEN TREE 
MEDICAL CENTER ASSOCIATES; HAMPTON 
MEDICAL CENTER; HEALTH CENTER ASSOCIATES; 
HUSSAINI MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; IRWIN MEDICAL 
CENTER; IRWIN PRIMARY CARE ASSCOCIATES; 
MAMATASTRAGOOR KHAN PRIMARY CARE 
ASSOCIATES; MCDONALD PRIMARY CARE; 
MEADOWLANDS PRIMARY CARE; MEDICAL CENTER 
CLINIC, P.C.; META-HILBERG HEMATOLOGY 
ONCOLOGY ASSOCIATES, INC.;  
MONROEVILLE MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; M.H.V. 
MURTHY, MD; NATRONA HEIGHTS OB/GYN, INC.; 
NORTH VERSAILLES MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; PAUL 
REILLY, MD; PEDIATRIC & NEONATAL ASSOCIATES;  
PEDIATRIC & NEONATAL ASSOCIATES, INC.; PENN 
HILLS MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; PENNSYLVANIA 
COMPREHENSIVE CARE ASSOCIATES; PINE 
HOLLOW MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; PINE RICHLAND 
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MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; PITTSBURGH CARDIO 
THORACIC ASSOCIATES; PITTSBURGH 
CARDIOTHORACIC ACCOCIATES; PLUM MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATES; PRIMARY CARE NORTHSIDE; 
PRIMAMRY CARE SOUTH; RIAD SARADAR, MD; 
ROBERT BARAFF, MD; FRANK E. SESSOMSM.D., INC; 
STERLING MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; THREE RIVERS 
IMAGING ASSOCIATES, P.C.; TRI COUNTY 
CARDIOLOGY; TRI COUNTY CARDIOLOGY, INC.; 
UNITED PHYSICIANS; VASCULAR CENTER OF 
WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA, INC.; WATERDAM 
MEDICAL ASSOCIATES; WEST PENN ALLEGHENY 
EYE ASSOCIATES, P.C.; WEST PENN ALLEGHENY 
FOUNDATION, LLC; WEST PENN ALLEGHENY 
HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. (CORP); 
WEST PENN ALLEGHENY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. 
(NON PROFIT CORP); WEST PENN ALLEGHENY 
HEALTH SYSTEM PRIMARY CARE NETWORK;  
WEST PENN ALLEGHENY ONCOLOGY NETWORK; 
WEST PENN ALLEGHENY PHYSICIANS, LLC; WEST 
PENN ALLEGHENY SENIOR CARE; WEST PENN 
BREAST SURGERY PRACTICE; WEST PENN 
COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE, P.C.; WEST PENN 
CORPORATE MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.;  
WEST PENN FAMILY PRACTICE; WEST PENN 
INTERNAL MEDICINE ASSOCIATES; WEST PENN 
PHYSICIANS' ORGANIZATION; WEST PENN 
PHYSICIAN PRACTICE NETWORK; WEST PENN 
PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY; WEST 
PENN PLASTIC SURGERY; WEST PENN SURGICAL 
SUPPLY CO.; WEST PENN SPECIALTY MSO, INC.; 
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WEST VIEW FAMILY HEALTH ASSOCIATES; THE 
WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA BURN FOUNDATION; 
WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA CANCER INSTITUTE;  
THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA CARDIOVASCULAR 
INSTITUTE; WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA DIAGNOSTIC 
CLINIC; WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HEART PLAN 
INC.; THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL 
FOUNDATION;THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
HOSPITAL-FORBES REGIONAL CAMPUS;  
THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL SCHOOL 
OF NURSING; THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
HOSPITAL SKILLED NURSING FACILITY;  
WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA OB/GYN ASSOCIATES; 
THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE; WEXFORD MEDICAL PRACTICE; 
WEXFORD WEIGHT LOSS 
 
      
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court Nos. 3-09-cv-00085 and 2-10-cv-00948) 
District Judges: Honorable Cathy Bisson and Honorable 
Donetta W. Ambrose 
      
 
Argued March 6, 2013 
 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO and VANASKIE, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 4, 2013) 
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Jared K. Cook, Esquire 
Justin M. Cordello, Esquire 
Michael J. Lingle, Esquire 
Patrick Solomon, Esquire 
J. Nelson Thomas, Esquire (Argued) 
Thomas & Solomon 
693 East Avenue 
New York, NY   14607 
 
Counsel for appellants in case 12-1446 and case 12-1903 
 
 
 
Wendy W. Feinstein, Esquire 
Mariah L. Klinefelter, Esquire 
John J. Myers, Esquire (Argued) 
Andrew T. Quesnelle, Esquire 
Mark A. Willard, Esquire 
Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellot 
600 Grant Street 
44
th
 Floor, U. S. Steel Tower 
Pittsburgh, PA   15219 
 
Counsel for appellees in case 12-1446 
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Alexandra Bak-Boychuk, Esquire 
David S. Fryman, Esquire (Argued) 
William K. Kennedy, II, Esquire 
John B. Langel, Esquire 
Ballard Spahr 
1735 Market Street 
51
st
 Floor 
Philadelphia, PA   19103 
 
Robert B. Cottington, Esquire 
Cohen & Grigsby 
625 Liberty Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA   15222 
 
Counsel for appellees in case 12-1903 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this consolidated appeal we consider whether named 
plaintiffs may appeal a district court order denying final 
certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2007). The 
named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their individual claims 
with prejudice but seek to pursue an appeal on behalf of 
others who opted into the litigation before the District Court. 
We conclude that the named plaintiffs lack final orders 
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Thus, we will dismiss 
these appeals for lack of jurisdiction. 
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I. 
 
“The FLSA establishes federal minimum-wage, 
maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be 
modified by contract.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 
133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2013). Under Section 16(b) of the 
FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), an employee may bring an action 
against his employer individually, on his own behalf, and 
collectively, on behalf of other “similarly situated” 
employees. Id. In order to become parties to a collective 
action under Section 16(b), employees must affirmatively 
opt-in by filing written consents with the court. 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b). This feature distinguishes the collective-action 
mechanism under Section 16(b) from the class-action 
mechanism under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, where, 
once the class is certified, those not wishing to be included in 
the class must affirmatively opt-out.  
 
Courts in our Circuit follow a two-step process for 
deciding whether an action may properly proceed as a 
collective action under the FLSA. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores 
Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 535 (3d Cir. 2012). Applying a “fairly 
lenient standard” at the first step, the court makes a 
preliminary determination as to whether the named plaintiffs 
have made a “modest factual showing” that the employees 
identified in their complaint are “similarly situated.”  Id. at 
536 & n.4. If the plaintiffs have satisfied their burden, the 
court will “conditionally certify” the collective action for the 
purpose of facilitating notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs and 
conducting pre-trial discovery. Id. at 536. At the second stage, 
with the benefit of discovery, “a court following this 
approach then makes a conclusive determination as to 
whether each plaintiff who has opted in to the collective 
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action is in fact similarly situated to the named plaintiff.” 
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 656 F.3d 189, 193 (3d 
Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 
1526. This step may be triggered by the plaintiffs’ motion for 
“final certification,” by the defendants’ motion for 
“decertification,” or, commonly, by both.  If the plaintiffs 
succeed in carrying their heavier burden at this stage, the case 
may proceed on the merits as a collective action. Id. 
 
It is under this framework that Appellants brought 
their actions.  
 
II. 
 
The first consolidated action was commenced on April 
2, 2009, by Karen Camesi, Erin O’Connell, Dinah Baker, and 
Lori Shaffer (the “Camesi Named Plaintiffs”) against UPMC 
and multiple related entities (collectively, “UPMC”) in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania on behalf of themselves and “similarly situated” 
individuals. (Camesi J.A. at A-40). They alleged that their 
employer, UPMC, violated the FLSA by failing to ensure that 
they were paid for time worked during meal breaks. Upon 
filing their complaint, the Camesi Named Plaintiffs moved for 
expedited conditional certification.  (Id.) The motion was 
granted in May 2009, notice was directed to potential 
collective-action members, and 3,115 individuals opted into 
the lawsuit. (Camesi Br. Appellee at 5). After preliminary 
discovery, UPMC filed a motion to decertify the collective 
action and the Camesi Named Plaintiffs filed a motion for 
final certification. (Camesi J.A. at A-114-16). The District 
Court granted UPMC’s motion and denied the Camesi Named 
Plaintiffs’ motion on December 20, 2011, and dismissed the 
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claims of the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice. (Id. at A-1). 
The Camesi Named Plaintiffs did not ask the District Court to 
certify its interlocutory December 20, 2011 order for appeal, 
but, instead, moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(a) for “voluntary dismissal of their claims with prejudice 
in order to secure a final judgment for purposes of appeal.” 
(Id. at A-1565). The District Court granted the unopposed 
motion on January 30, 2012, stating that “Plaintiffs’ 
remaining claim are hereby dismissed with prejudice in order 
to allow Plaintiffs to seek appellate review.” (Id. at A-96).  
 
In the other consolidated action, Andrew Kuznyetsov, 
Charles Boal, and Marthann Heilman (the “Kuznyetsov 
Named Plaintiffs,” or collectively with Camesi Named 
Plaintiffs, “Appellants”), filed individual and collective 
actions in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania against their employer, West Penn 
Allegheny Health System, Inc. and other related defendants 
(collectively, “West Penn,” or collectively with UPMC, 
“Appellees”), on April 1, 2009. Their complaint similarly 
alleged that they were not compensated for work performed 
during meal breaks in violation of the FLSA. (Kuznyetsov Br. 
Appellants at 3; Br. West Penn at 3). The District Court 
conditionally certified the collective action and facilitated 
notice to potential collective-action members, 820 of whom 
opted into the lawsuit. (Br. West Penn at 4). On December 20, 
2011, the District Court decertified the class on West Penn’s 
motion and denied the Kuznyetsov Named Plaintiffs’ motion 
for final certification. (Kuznyetsov App. at A15). Then, on 
February 29, 2012, the District Court granted the Kuznyetsov 
Named Plaintiffs’ motion under Rule 41(a) for “voluntary 
dismissal of their claims with prejudice in order to secure a 
final judgment for purposes of appeal,” and also dismissed 
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the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice. (Pls.’ 
Mot. for Vol. Dismissal with Prejudice for Purposes of 
Appeal at 1, No. 10-0948, Doc. No. 145; Kuznyetsov App. at 
A17). 
 
Both sets of named plaintiffs now appeal. Because 
both cases raise the same issue, we have consolidated them 
before us. 
 
III. 
 
We begin by considering whether Appellants’ 
voluntary dismissal of their claims with prejudice under Rule 
41(a) left them with a final order appealable under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. This question of first impression requires us to 
consider the scope of two strands of Third Circuit authority: 
Sullivan v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 566 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 
1977), in which we held that a plaintiff may not obtain 
appellate review after incurring a dismissal for failure to 
prosecute for the purpose of seeking to appeal an 
interlocutory class-certification order, and Fassett v. Delta 
Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1986), in which we 
permitted plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss a portion of their 
case in order to appeal an order of the district court 
terminating the remainder of their case. In considering the 
significance of these cases, we bear in mind that, while an 
appeal from a final judgment necessarily, and permissibly, 
appeals prior orders of the district court, Appellants here seek 
review of only the orders decertifying their collective actions, 
and do not complain of the “final” orders that dismissed their 
cases. 
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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review 
“final decisions” of the district courts.  Giles v. Campbell, 698 
F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 2012). “‘A ‘final decision’ generally is 
one . . . [that] ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’” Harris 
v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 618 F.3d 398, 400 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 
(1945)). The finality rule guards against piecemeal litigation. 
Giles, 698 F.3d at 157.  
 
Generally, a dismissal with prejudice constitutes an 
appealable final order under § 1291. See, e.g., In re Merck & 
Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 399 (3d 
Cir. 2007). Furthermore, “[u]nder the ‘merger rule,’ prior 
interlocutory orders [such as class-certification decisions] 
merge with the final judgment in a case, and the interlocutory 
orders (to the extent that they affect the final judgment) may 
be reviewed on appeal from the final order.” In re 
Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d Cir. 1996). 
Even so, Appellees urge that Appellants’ voluntary dismissals 
of their claims constitute impermissible attempts to 
manufacture finality under Sullivan. We agree.  
 
In Sullivan, the plaintiffs brought a class action under 
Rule 23. 566 F.2d at 444-45. On the day Sullivan was 
scheduled for trial, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ 
motion to certify a class action. Id. at 445. The plaintiffs, in 
turn, refused to present any evidence at trial and the district 
court dismissed their claims under Rule 41(b) for failure to 
prosecute. Id. The plaintiffs then sought review of the denial 
of class certification by our Court, arguing that the dismissal 
for failure to prosecute was a final order appealable pursuant 
to § 1291. Id.  
  
13 
 
 
We began our opinion by noting that a “class 
certification decision, per se, is not an appealable final order 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,” but rather is an interlocutory order. 
Id. We characterized the dismissal for failure to prosecute “as 
an attempt to avoid this [C]ourt’s firm position against 
interlocutory appeals of class certification determinations.” 
Id. Such a “strategy,” this Court reasoned, was impermissible 
because “‘[i]f a litigant could refuse to proceed whenever a 
trial judge ruled against him, wait for the court to enter a 
dismissal for failure to prosecute, and then obtain review of 
the judge’s interlocutory decision, the policy against 
piecemeal litigation and review would be severely 
weakened.’” Id. at 445 (quoting Marshall v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 
917, 919 (3d Cir. 1974)). Allowing such a practice would risk 
“inundati[ng] . . . appellate dockets with requests for review 
of interlocutory orders and . . . [could] undermine the ability 
of trial judges to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases.’” Id. at 445-46. Therefore, we dismissed 
the appeal for lack of an appealable order.
1
  
                                              
1
 Additionally, Appellees emphasize that the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have also 
concluded that plaintiffs may not appeal a dismissal for lack 
of prosecution where the plaintiffs caused that dismissal in 
order to appeal. See Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608 F.2d 1234, 
1236 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that reviewing the denial of 
class-action certification after plaintiff’s action was dismissed 
for failure to prosecute would violate the spirit of Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), in which the Court 
held that a decertification order was not an appealable final 
order); Hughley v. Eaton Corp., 572 F.2d 556, 557 (6th Cir. 
1978) (holding that dismissal for failure to prosecute rendered 
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 We believe that Sullivan is so similar to the cases 
before us as to be controlling. In the past, we have “looked to 
Rule 23 decisions by analogy in determining appealability” of 
orders in FLSA collective actions. Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 
F.2d 1062, 1068 n.8 (3d Cir. 1988). We find it appropriate to 
do so here because an order decertifying a Section 16(b) 
collective action is interlocutory, just like a certification 
decision is in the Rule 23 context. Id. at 1067-68.  
 
 Like the plaintiffs in Sullivan, Appellants have 
attempted to short-circuit the procedure for appealing an 
interlocutory district court order that is separate from, and 
unrelated to, the merits of their case. Appellants could have 
obtained appellate review of the decertification order by 
proceeding to final judgment on the merits of their individual 
claims. Or, Appellants could have asked the District Courts to 
certify their interlocutory orders for appeal. But Appellants 
instead sought to convert an interlocutory order into a final 
appealable order by obtaining dismissal under Rule 41. If we 
were to allow such a procedural sleight-of-hand to bring 
about finality here, there is nothing to prevent litigants from 
employing such a tactic to obtain review of discovery orders, 
evidentiary rulings, or any of the myriad decisions a district 
court makes before it reaches the merits of an action. This 
would greatly undermine the policy against piecemeal 
litigation embodied by § 1291.    
 
Appellants counter that Sullivan is inapposite and we 
should instead follow the approach we followed in Fassett, 
807 F.2d at 1154, and Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh National 
                                                                                                     
moot any prior ruling of the district court). We read these 
cases as consistent with Sullivan.  
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Bank, 919 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1990). But Fassett and 
Trevino-Barton are clearly distinguishable. In Fassett, the 
question of finality arose after the plaintiff elected to dismiss 
her claim against the sole defendant who remained following 
the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of all 
other original defendants.  807 F.2d at 1154-55. Although the 
dismissal of the remaining defendant was without prejudice, 
we concluded that the order was nevertheless final and 
appealable because the statute of limitations had run on the 
claims against that defendant. Id. Similarly, in Trevino-
Barton, 919 F.2d at 878, we allowed an appeal where a 
plaintiff agreed to abandon the single count of her complaint 
that she had voluntarily dismissed without prejudice 
following the district court’s entry of summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants on all of the remaining counts of her 
complaint. Id.; see also O’Boyle v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 866 
F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding same).
2
 In both of these 
                                              
2
 Appellants also invoke a slew of out-of-circuit precedent 
following a similar approach. Not only are these cases not 
binding in the Third Circuit, they are also clearly 
distinguishable. Compare Helm Fin. Corp. v. MNVA R.R., 
212 F.3d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (allowing appeal 
following voluntary dismissal of claims where the district 
court’s earlier order denying plaintiff summary judgment on 
those claims effectively terminated the claims), and St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 959 F.2d 960, 961 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (permitting an appeal where plaintiff 
dismissed her complaint following the district court’s denial 
of leave to amend by adding additional claims), with John’s 
Insulation, Inc. v. L. Addison & Assocs., Inc., 156 F.3d 101, 
108 (1st Cir. 1998) (refusing to permit an appeal of 
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cases, all of the claims had effectively been barred either by 
the court or as a matter of law, and, importantly, it was the 
court’s grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff as to 
the merits of most of the claims that was the subject of the 
appeal. Here, the subject of the appeal is not the dismissal, 
but rather, the decertification order.   
 
Appellants read Fassett and Trevino-Barton as 
establishing a rule that “a voluntary dismissal under Rule 
41(a), sought to obtain appellate review, is a final appealable 
order.” (Appellants’ Resp. to Appellees’ Mot. to Dismiss the 
Appeal at 5). But neither case holds so broadly. Instead, we 
understand Fassett and Trevino-Barton to stand for the 
proposition that when a plaintiff has suffered an adverse 
judgment on the merits as to claims or defendants A, B, and 
C, which would otherwise be final and appealable were it not 
for remaining claim or defendant D, he or she may elect to 
forgo D in order to obtain review of the order respecting A, 
B, and C. Neither case permits a plaintiff who has suffered an 
adverse decision collateral to the merits of A, B, C, and D to 
throw out his or her entire action to obtain review of that 
interlocutory ruling. That, of course, is exactly what happened 
here, where there was clearly no judgment on the merits. But 
even Fassett cautioned against this, stating that this Court 
“will not permit an indirect review of interlocutory rulings 
that may not be subject to direct review.” 807 F.2d at 1155. 
Thus, Appellants’ reliance on Fassett and Trevino-Barton is 
misplaced.  
 
                                                                                                     
interlocutory orders following dismissal for failure to 
prosecute).  
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 In sum, the District Courts’ orders decertifying the 
collective actions were interlocutory. Appellants were not 
entitled to appeal these orders directly under § 1291. Nor can 
Appellants avoid the strong presumption against interlocutory 
review of such orders by voluntarily dismissing all of their 
claims under Rule 41. Thus, these appeals must be dismissed 
for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  
 
IV. 
 
Appellees urge an alternative bar to our exercise of 
jurisdiction over the review sought by Appellants, namely 
that, even if we were to find finality, Appellants’ voluntary 
relinquishment of their individual claims has rendered the 
cases moot.  
 
Article III requires “that ‘an actual controversy must 
be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the 
complaint is filed.’” Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1528 (quoting 
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 
(1997)). An action is rendered moot when “an intervening 
circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a ‘personal stake in the 
outcome of the lawsuit,’ at any point during the litigation.” Id. 
(quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 
(1990)).   
 
 We understand Appellants’ argument to be that they 
continue to maintain a personal stake in the outcome of the 
litigation because, as a result of (and notwithstanding) their 
dismissal of their claims with prejudice, “their individual 
claims are now tied to the outcome of this appeal.” 
(Kuznyetsov Resp. to West Penn Mot. 12-14). Appellants 
apparently believe that reversal of the District Courts’ 
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decertification orders on appeal would resurrect their 
individual claims once again at the district court level. 
However, this reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
nature of a dismissal with prejudice. The claims that 
Appellants dismissed with prejudice are gone forever—they 
are not reviewable by this Court and may not be recaptured at 
the district court level. See Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 
522 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that where a litigant voluntarily 
dismisses a portion of their claims in order to secure an 
appeal, those dismissed claims are extinguished forever), see 
also Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, 16 F.3d 1073, 1077 
(9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a party may not revive claims 
dismissed for the purposes of establishing a final appealable 
order). As such, Appellants’ individual claims are moot. 
 
The question then becomes whether, in the absence of 
any individual claim, Appellants nonetheless retain a personal 
stake in the outcome of the litigation sufficient to prevent the 
entire action from being rendered moot because they claim an 
interest in representing others who have opted into the 
collective action. 
 
We note that the issue of a named plaintiff’s ability to 
maintain actions in a representative capacity in collective 
actions brought under the FLSA, as compared to Rule 23 
class actions, is in a state of flux. The Supreme Court has 
recently reinforced its view that these procedural mechanisms 
are essentially different. See Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1529. 
What remains unclear, however, is whether the fact that 
individuals have already opted into Appellants’ actions by 
filing written consents with the District Courts following 
conditional certification would permit Appellants to retain a 
justiciable interest in the litigation based on their 
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representative capacities. We need not decide whether it may, 
however, because we believe that the unique fact pattern 
here—namely, Appellants’ voluntary dismissal of their claims 
with prejudice—has not only extinguished Appellants’ 
individual claims, but also any residual representational 
interest that they may have once had. Ruppert v. Principal 
Life Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
a Rule 23 named plaintiff’s acceptance of a settlement offer 
as to his individual claims mooted his interest in the denial of 
class certification); Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
636 F.3d 88, 100 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen a putative class 
plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the individual claims 
underlying a request for class certification, . . . there is no 
longer a self-interested party . . . necessary to satisfy Article 
III standing.”); cf. Pettrey v. Enter. Title Agency, Inc., 584 
F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Since the plaintiffs no longer 
have an interest in shifting  . . . costs to the putative class 
members [following settlement of their claims], the court 
cannot avoid the conclusion that this case is moot.”). This is 
so because it would be anomalous to conclude that Appellants 
are “similarly situated” to opt-in plaintiffs who, unlike 
Appellants, have actually retained their individual claims. 
Without any personal stake in the matter, Appellants should 
not be permitted to represent opt-in plaintiffs. See White v. 
Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 699 F.3d 869, 878 (6th Cir. 
2012) (“[A] lead plaintiff cannot be similarly situated and 
represent opt-in plaintiffs without a viable claim.”); Grace v. 
Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 637 F.3d 508, 519 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(holding same).   
 
Therefore, we will leave for another day the difficult 
question of whether an interest in representing opt-in 
  
20 
 
collective-action plaintiffs alone may satisfy the personal-
stake requirement of Article III.  
 
V. 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we will dismiss both 
appeals for lack of jurisdiction. 
